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PANEL DISCUSSION
The discussion opened with the observation by Dean Griswold that he
did not find himself in disagreement with what either Nathan Glazer or
Drew Days had said He did offer a warning against the tendency of well-
meaning adminstrators to accomplish their civil rights goals through
quota-type devices based on an ethnic or sex proportionality concept.
I find myself quite concerned by the bureaucrats in this picture. They
are able, conscientious, zealous people, many of whom work in a particu-
lar agency with little occasion to take an overall view, and there is a very
considerable tendency on the part of bureaucrats, it seems to me, to press
things to a dryly logical extreme, to use again a phrase of Justice Holmes.
I think of that nonsense about how it is illegal to have father-son ban-
quets in the public schools, remember that? And the further nonsense,
maybe even being defended by Mr. Days' division, that you must have
girls on boys baseball teams. And to me this has nothing whatever to do
with discrimination, sexism, racism, or anything else of the kind. I think I
even detected a little of that in Mr. Days' remarks about how fine it is that
we do not have quotas, but until an organization has eleven or twelve
percent black employees, there will still be discrimination, and something
ought to be done about it. I think that is the only thing in his commentary
that I would really disagree with. I think that before we get to that place
we will have accomplished a good deal of what we need to accomplish in
this area, just as I sense [that] . . . we have practically completed the job
with respect to the Oriental-Americans.
The following excerpts of the ensuing interchange among the panelists
present some highlights of the discussion.
Drew Days:
I am not suggesting that we go back and show in every case, or be re-
quired to show, intentional discrimination. I am just afraid that we are
going through this period and have lost the sense that what we are talking
about is, in many cases, intentional discrimination.
Erwin Griswold"
I would like to make an answer to that which may be a little legalistic
... I took the position in argument [arguing Swann v. Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg Bd ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), as Solicitor General] that if Judge
McMillan's order was based on prior discrimination, it was valid; but that
if it was, in fact, based on an effort to achieve a racial balance, it was
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invalid. And the Supreme Court adopted that argument almost in exactly
the words that appeared in my brief. I happen to think that was right. I
think that efforts by law to achieve racial balance are invidious. They
carry with them an implication that black or all black is inferior, and I do
not think that should be our law. . . . I would hope that we have not
come to the place where a mere variation in racial balance is in itself a
basis for judicial relief on grounds of discrimination.
Drew Days.-
We really do not disagree, Dean. When I talked about the effects test,
obviously, I recognize that it is a rebuttable presumption . . . . [T]he
defendant can come back and show that there is some nondiscriminatory
justification for the disparity. I, of course, agree with that process and
enforce those laws every day.
Moderator:
Do you believe in quotas?
Drew Days.
I believe in quotas where the courts have made a finding of past discrimi-
nation, and the courts have determined that the use of quotas represents
the most effective way of remedying that past discrimination, but I do not
believe in quotas-or goals, for that matter-in the abstract.
Nathan Glazer.-
I was surprised to hear Mr. Days say that there is a statutory determina-
tion that numbers establish a presumption of discrimination and I was
wondering where. That is what I understood you to say-by law of Con-
gress, if there are great disparities in numbers, one may presume
discrimination.
Drew Days:
The Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976), is a perfect example.
Nathan Glazer.-
I was thinking of education and employment, and while you're quite cor-
rect about the Voting Rights Act, I don't see any such statutory action in
those areas on that issue.
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Drew Days:
Well, I'm also talking about court interpretation. One situation involves
non-English speaking children.
Nathan Glazer, responding to a question concerning discriminatory prac-
tices today
Well, I think there are two points there, and one is what do I think is
the general character of racist and discriminatory practices today, and the
other relates to past effects.
In the areas I know of, and the research I know of has been quite exten-
sive, I do not see that one can document, for current practice, in education
or employment a general pattern of discrimination. In fact, I think the
research documents just the opposite. This is my best judgment, which is
not to say that in a big country like this there are not hundreds or
thousands of individual cases of discrimination. It is to say that if one
takes, for example, young blacks entering the labor force, they get, ac-
cording to very good research by reputable economists, about the same
kind of jobs and income that whites get, taking into account their educa-
tion. And if one takes blacks exiting college, similarly, they get the kinds
of jobs and incomes whites get, so that I think this is a vast change.
Now, what Mr. Days is talking about, and it is a very sober and serious
point, is the obvious fact that even if practices today are on the whole
nondiscriminatory, and even if in cases of discrimination there are ways
to get redress, these do not deal with the fact that there has been massive
and pervasive discrimination and racism for three-and-a-half centuries.
What one does about that is, in all honesty, difficult. I can see the legal
legitimacy of reparations, etc. But can that be worked out politically, or
practically? I think not.
Drew Days, responding to a question aboutproof of discriminatory intent:
I think it is certainly open to the courts to interpret intent or define intent
in ways that will permit us to make satisfying or satisfactory determina-
tions of the scope and nature of discrimination. Whether the courts will
do that is quite a different matter. For example, in the case of Washington
v. Davis [426 U.S. 229 (1976)], regarding the extent to which statistics can
be relied upon to establish intent, we still have, it seems to me, the nag-
ging question of state action. Professor Glazer referred to that. It seems
to me, however, that often there is really no logical cutoff point in terms
of the extension of state action. The courts have simply said "thus far and
no farther," perhaps without finding the answer in the Constitution or
statute. These are matters that I think the courts are going to have to be
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presented with and respond to. We may not be successful. But I am
concerned with the educational process so that the people understand
what is going on. Whether the courts ultimately understand it is no cause
to wait.
Nathan Glazer.-
I think that educational institutions and others have been so invaded by
state requirements that to speak of some degree of autonomy is not to say
absolute autonomy. I am just trying to retain an area in which they can
act more independently than a state agency, as such, cannot. I think, even
in the area of hiring, a degree of autonomy is reasonable. There are reli-
gious institutions; there are ethnically oriented institutions; and I imagine,
as presently interpreted, they fall totally under the full reach of equal
employment laws and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
and I think that is a problem . . . . If there were such things as, let us
say, a . . . black institution that was committed to black culture and
goals, I would think they might prefer, for certain purposes and for cer-
tain jobs, blacks over whites. I admit that I am going beyond the frame of
this discussion to raise things that seem out of the question in our Consti-
tution and law-ridden society. How do you deal with the problem of eth-
nic and racial and religious diversity and decency? In terms of my values,
it is a legitimate exercise of autonomy.
Erwin Griswold, responding to a question how discrimination should be
de.fned"
My temptation is to follow [Justice] Potter Stewart when he said that, "I
can't define obscenity, but I know what it is." I think I would be inclined
to say that a comprehensive, complete, totally accurate definition of dis-
crimination would be very long, very complicated, and futile; but I know
some of the evils of discrimination, and I am against them, and I hope we
keep on making progress with them.
Drew Days:
We usually, in talking about violations of the equal protection clause, talk
about invidious discrimination. I would urge you to look up invidious in
the dictionary and maybe come back one day and tell me what that
means. It tends to be basically a subjective test; apparently, invidiousness
is in the eyes of the beholder.
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A'laian Glazer.-
I do not want to muddy the waters, but I had an easy definition of dis-
crimination. I thought that it was treating people differently on grounds
of race, creed, color, or national origin, but obviously, things have come a
Ion way since that definition.
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